First, as Carl von Clausewitz famously said in On War, war is the realm of chance and uncertainty. Clarifying this issue is about more than historical pedantry. Unlike the initial period of war when most recruits were veterans, most new recruits and volunteers have little military experience. Polina Beliakova at the Fletcher School has done an in-depth review of this corruption and says that both equipment and logistics suffered as a result. Fourth, analysts should expand their mental models to consider a wider range of potential conflict scenarios. A common flaw in examinations of Russian and Chinese weapons systems is to use a maximum effective range to create a radius, draw a big red circle, and declare it a no-go zone. Such representations appear to be rigorous analysis, but tend to vastly overstate combat capability, especially where factors like countermeasures, weather, and confusion constrain system performance. The obvious temptation is to discount the potential performance of Russian forces. Only two Ukrainian soldiers died defending Crimea. Request an institutional free trial for your entire organization. Instead, the complexity of war is best understood through the synthesis of multiple factors using inclusive, multi-disciplinary approaches. OBrien argues that Western analysts obsession with technologies and doctrine blinded them to flaws in Russias ability to execute complex operations. Kofman has argued that such limitations, along with Russias active defense strategy, would push Russia toward opportunistic strategic raids to upset the international order (while China becomes a new hegemon), rather than the sort of massed assault theyve launched against Ukraine. Others have taken a more critical approach. This may have been sustainable during the Soviet period when they had a very large ground force and Warsaw Pact allies to provide additional forces. comprehensive analysis every weekday . It announces triumphs at a regular clip including intermediate-range nuclear platforms, hypersonic missiles, advanced torpedoes, aircraft, and armored vehicles. Russias divergence from its doctrine and basic military principles noted during the podcast undercuts OBriens comparison of Russian performance in 2022 to French performance in 1940. Second, morale is dynamic and contingent the motivated Finnish forces that imposed heavy casualties on the Red Army during the Winter War, for example, became the cynical veterans of the Continuation War in Vin Linnas classic novel Unknown Soldiers. Photo: Soldiers of the DNR (Donetsk People's Republic) run with a stretcher carrying an injured separatist in a contested area of Mariupol. These veterans and other volunteers (including foreign recruits, some with previous military experience) were quickly mobilized into Ukraines new, volunteer Territorial Defense Forces (TDF) and Reserve, without the need for lengthy training. Russias armed revanchism has been so unsettling in part because Europe and the United States downplayed the Russian threat from 19902014. The same Mikhail Khodaryonok shocked viewers of 60 Minutes, the main talk show on Russias state-owned Rossiya 1 TV channel. Its status as the army of the Chinese Communist Party has raised concerns about corruption. These demands place a heavy burden on junior leaders who, because of Russias recruiting difficulties, may not be up to the task. There are obviously gradations Chinese leadership rates better than North Korean, for example but we assume opponents will make reasonable, informed decisions if possible. enter your email address then choose one of the three options below. Unlike western militaries, which devolve many responsibilities to professional non-commissioned officers, Russian officers oversee every aspect of their units. Countries like the US have the resources to pay for both technology and the sinews of war such as training and logistics. And since their public commentary about the success of their military reforms is so clearly untrue, should we also be questioning their claimed advances in technology, such as hypersonic weapon systems? He told the Times: Everything is in order. As energy prices continue to soar with no reprieve in sight, the continued fallout from, Public health officials and those with significant sway in setting health policy were joyous last, In Crimea, Russia Showcases a Rebooted Army., Why Congress Should Leave Abortion to the States, New Envoy to S. Korea Arrives at a Promising Time, The FDA Is Funding and Approving Cigarettes. They need information, command and control, and logistical support to become combat capabilities. Third, modern analysts are hesitant to emphasize these attributes as it gets dangerously close to racist or essentialist descriptions of national character that have historically led analysts astray. According to a daily tally maintained by Robert Homans, an American Ukraine expert in Washington, Russia lost 30,700 soldiers in the first three months of the war more than double the 14,453 Soviet soldiers killed during the Soviet Unions 10-year occupation of Afghanistan. Due to losses and the need to rotate out troops, Ukraine has had to recruit and train a substantial amount of replacements. Russia seems to have prioritized one at the expense of the other. Likewise, these personnel challenges and persistent issues like hazing raise questions about Russian morale. Many informed observers believed that the Russian armed forces had become significantly more formidable, leading some to argue that Ukraines smaller and lower-tech force would be swiftly beaten in the early days of the war. To make matters worse, unlike Russias military, the Peoples Liberation Army hasnt fought a war since its failed invasion of Vietnam in 1979. Analysts could be excused for seeing a paper tiger crouching amidst these flaws. The historian Philipps Payson OBrien, for example, wrote an article for The Atlantic early in the war comparing the Western failure to grasp Russian weakness to misguided assessments of French vulnerabilities prior to its defeat by Germany in 1940. Leadership and morale are more difficult to assess. The following is the June 29, 2022, Congressional Research Service In Focus report, Ukrainian Military Performance and Outlook. Underestimating Russias resilience and determination to achieve its security goals in the 1990s was perhaps understandable. 1275 Pennsylvania Ave NW | Suite 400 | Washington, DC 20004 | Phone: 202.551.92002020 by the Center for European Policy Analysis, All Rights Reserved, Transatlantic Defense and Security Program. He reassured viewers of state-controlled TV that the outlook for Russian soldiers in Ukraine this summer is not so bad. The UAF has continued to benefit from high levels of recruitment and motivation. With 850,000 active-duty forces, the modern Russian army is just not big enough to conduct large-scale offensive operations and occupy territories without reconstituting units, especially as their best soldiers were disproportionately concentrated in the BTGs initially sent into combat and badly battered by the Ukrainians. The author worked with a Lithuanian brigadier-general at the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) who had been in the Soviet army prior to the Fall of the Wall in 1989. Chinese military reforms over the last 20 years, combined with President Xi Jinpings counter-corruption policies, have created a more professional and accountable force. I strongly agree with these focus areas, but analysts have been paying attention to them for years. The Russian system is based on tight control of information and highly centralized decision-making. Instead, the world watched as Ukrainians rallied to stop the Russians dead in their tracks. A maximalist strategy to expel all Russian forces from pre-2014 Ukrainian territory might therefore be morally satisfying, but militarily infeasible. High losses, however, pose an ongoing challenge to the UAFs ability to maintain effective and sustained operations. This is a pretty simple way for the Ukrainians to see where senior officers are and to target them. Many Pentagon analysts reportedly assumed Russian forces were capable and competently led and that their equipment would work as advertised. While tempting, this would be foolhardy. It is fair to say that Russian military reforms have been a disaster, and not just for Russia. There is no more such shame as broken tanks and A.P.C.s on the road, and outdated weaponry. Their uniforms were crisp and neat, and their new helmets were bedecked with tinted safety goggles, reported the Times. Although the Russian Federation apportioned resources to update the military (the 2010 state armaments program alone invested around $626bn from 2010-20), much of that money disappeared into the greedy maw of the Russian state, mainly the oligarchs and the siloviki or former security service men who run the government for Putin. Doing it again today would be inexcusable. Specialists will remember when the Russians fired 26 Kalibrs at targets in Syria and four went down in Iran, not even hitting the right country. But once again, Russias armed forces are having difficulty with resupply, with the result that many mechanized units have been sitting by the side of the road out of fuel. They expected Russias larger and better-equipped forces would quickly dispatch Ukraines military and force its government to surrender. Unfortunately, if most of the professionals are concentrated in the first unit out the door and it then takes significant casualties during an operation, all that is left is conscripts, reservists, and other second-tier personnel, which does not bode well for longer-term operations. This approach has downsides. Blocked in Kyivs suburbs, Russian soldiers descended into looting, drinking, raping and shooting civilians. Vi i ng nhn vin gm cc nh nghin cu c bng tin s trong ngnh dc phm, dinh dng cng cc lnh vc lin quan, Umeken dn u trong vic nghin cu li ch sc khe ca m, cc loi tho mc, vitamin v khong cht da trn nn tng ca y hc phng ng truyn thng. Credit: Maximilian Clarke / SOPA Images/Sipa USA. Russian publications have reported that service personnel are fed small quantities of rotting food by contractors whose behavior is apparently blessed by the defense ministry. OBrien is a serious thinker whose arguments merit engagement. First, like many militaries, Ukraine was in the process of developing a professional noncommissioned officer (NCO) corps along NATO standards before Russias 2022 invasion. Xin cm n qu v quan tm n cng ty chng ti. That surprise operation blindsided Ukraines unprepared and demoralized military. During a wargame several years ago, Massicot presciently cited command and control and logistics as factors that would limit Russias ability to execute complex operations against NATO. The Ukrainian Armed Forces (UAF) continue to face disadvantages in seeking to defend Ukraines territorial integrity against Russian military forces. Partisan units used drones to blow up tanks. . Others are more surprising, such as their inability to gain air superiority or use ground-based air defenses a longstanding strength of Soviet/Russian forces to prevent Ukraines air force from operating. Their performance has been dismal. Third, analysis should better account for real-world conditions. Putin thought the same. On the other hand, this resistance has come with losses in personnel and equipment, and the overall outlook for the war remains uncertain. Russian operations, by contrast, are failing because they appear to have thrown planning and doctrine out the window. If Western analysts erred regarding Russian logistics and command and control, it was in assuming Russia was aware of its limitations and would craft limited war plans to minimize them, rather than exacerbate them by launching a massive multi-pronged invasion of the second-largest country in Europe. Umeken t tr s ti Osaka v hai nh my ti Toyama trung tm ca ngnh cng nghip dc phm. It develops a plan to seize limited objectives like the Donbas that follows its doctrine and exploits its advantages in firepower and massed armor and minimizes its logistical shortcomings. The Biden Administration and Congress have expressed support for Ukraines defense of its territorial integrity against Russias invasion. However, Western analysts are reluctant to move from raising questions to basing assessments on leadership and morale. James Brooke is a visiting fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies with a focus on Ukraine. The relevant question now is, what lessons U.S. defense analysts should take from Russias disastrous performance? Reports that Russian soldiers deployed for combat believed they were still on exercises in friendly territory are common. Khng ch Nht Bn, Umeken c ton th gii cng nhn trong vic n lc s dng cc thnh phn tt nht t thin nhin, pht trin thnh cc sn phm chm sc sc khe cht lng kt hp gia k thut hin i v tinh thn ngh nhn Nht Bn. The UAF also faces two major hurdles to training and deploying new personnel. He wrote this for InsideSources.com. Like Russian forces, the Peoples Liberation Army has personnel shortcomings caused by a dearth of high-quality recruits. After over 100 days of the most intense combat Europe has seen in decades, the outcome remains very much in doubt. Europes Edge is an online journal covering crucial topics in the transatlantic policy debate. On this point, I agree wholeheartedly with OBriens critique. In my experience, analysts were loath to revisit assumptions, which were often sensitive topics that required months or years of deliberation to develop. Nm 1978, cng ty chnh thc ly tn l "Umeken", tip tc phn u v m rng trn ton th gii. Personnel On Feb. 25, many Western pundits predicted that the Russian army, the successor to the Soviet Unions Big Red Machine, would roll into Kyiv in days. written by leading topic experts. They say that they deployed the hypersonic Kinzal missile in Ukraine, however, the munition in the video they released is clearly not traveling at over 3,800 mph (the slowest speed considered hypersonic). Every military has good and bad days, so analysts focus on underlying strengths and weaknesses rather than more ephemeral qualities like individual leadership or morale. ~}_{rnwyzUfEm_f~K7^}@Zu}^7>U].~=V^e?=?(~4R\YukBgW[a=j]nw\7+}+x?7cS6o>. As we hit the wars 100-day mark on Friday, one of the most significant lessons is Russias much-feared modernized army, the largest in Europe, is, well, not so impressive. Second, defense analysis supports decades-long strategies and weapons purchases. 2022, World Politics Review LLC. Chris Dougherty is a senior fellow in the Defense Program and co-lead of the Gaming Lab at the Center for a New American Security. All opinions are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the position or viewsof the institutions they representor the Center for European Policy Analysis. Many elite units he sent south to Kyiv carried dress uniforms in their backpacks. Russias battalion tactical groups exemplify this issue. The situation (for Russia) will clearly get worse, he warned on May 16. Russia, like the United States and China, seems to have fallen in love with technology. One reason U.S. analysts misjudged Russian performance in Ukraine is that they primarily examine potential conflicts between Russia and NATO, such as a limited thrust into the Baltic states. German commanders conversely envisioned armor penetrating enemy lines and exploiting breakthroughs. Yet he makes key errors and misjudges defense analysis and the Russian military experts. Russia might still have failed following this more reasonable course, but it likely wouldnt have performed like a laughingstock. Nevertheless, Western analysts clearly overestimated Russias armed forces, which have demonstrated critical flaws and vulnerabilities. The Ukrainians have killed seven Russian generals and a number of colonels because the Russians are using civilian cell phones in an attempt to provide C2 at the forward edge of the battle area. Chinas economic power and growing technical sophistication aided by unprecedented industrial espionage have given it an ability to build advanced weaponry at a scale far exceeding that of Russia. China is aware of its challenges in developing good leaders witness its discussions of the two inabilities and the five incapables and is taking steps to address them to include much more rigorous training and assessment. They were sober., Aleksandr Golts, an independent military analyst in Moscow, praised Putins massive military spending in the early 2000s, saying: As a result of these reforms, Russia now has absolute superiority over any country in the post-Soviet space., The last word went to Mikhail Khodaryonok, a reserve Russian army colonel who was then editor in chief of Moscows Military-Industrial Courier. First, these issues are intangible and difficult to assess without firsthand knowledge. Umeken ni ting v k thut bo ch dng vin hon phng php c cp bng sng ch, m bo c th hp th sn phm mt cch trn vn nht. The F-35 aircraft program, for instance, began when Boris Yeltsin was Russias president and will outlast Putins regime. A Ukrainian serviceman steps on the barrel of a destroyed tank near the village of Malaya Rohan, Ukraine, April 1, 2022 (AP photo by Andrew Marienko). Theres no way to eliminate this uncertainty, but there are steps that the U.S. intelligence and defense communities could take to reduce the area of uncertainty or at least better understand its borders. He argued that Western analysts overlooked Russian weakness because they fixated on weapons systems and doctrine and ignored key factors like logistics, leadership, and morale. The other major problem they have is with secure communications. Doctrine, corroborated with data from exercises, wargames, operations, and intelligence, helps analysts understand how an opponent is likely to operate. On the one hand, since Russias renewed invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, the UAF has successfully defended against, and in some areas pushed back, Russian forces. It does, essentially, what it has belatedly started doing now after abandoning its initial plan. Trong nm 2014, Umeken sn xut hn 1000 sn phm c hng triu ngi trn th gii yu thch. Still, no methodology, no matter how effective, can overcome the uncertainty of warfare to arrive at the right answer. Fifth, analysts should be explicit about their assumptions and the limitations of their understanding. Second, analytical specialists should think more holistically and in concert with generalists about adversary military performance. During the 2010s, the Russians proudly announced a shift from a conscript-based force to armed forces manned by professionals, together with an improved and empowered non-commissioned officer (NCO) corps. They were preparing for a victory parade down Kreshchatyk, the main avenue of Ukraines capital. During the Battle of France, each side operated in ways that conformed with their pre-war thinking. The UAF did not have a fully developed professional NCO corps by the time of the invasion and continued to deal with issues with retention, professional development, and funding. In the immediate aftermath of Russias invasion of Ukraine, many military analysts found that their prewar predictions about the Russian militarys performance were wildly off the mark. Losses are likely higher among regular UAF and Special Forces units, forcing a greater reliance on TDF and Reserve units. Overestimation of a foe leads to misallocation of resources or missed opportunities. February 24, the day Russian President Vladimir Putin launched his unprovoked invasion of Ukraine, is going down as a turning point in modern history. He raises important questions about how analysts and policymakers assess military power. Their failure means that the Kremlin can only succeed by falling back on old 20th-centurydoctrines of applying overwhelming firepower to a target, like a Ukrainian city, and occupying the rubble with ground forces. Opening them up for debate can feel like unraveling a precisely woven tapestry, but its key to uncovering potential flaws in our thinking. Empowered NCOs need to have information and to be able to make decisions while leading. Soldiers deserted their units. Analysts can make informed assessments based on weapons systems, doctrine, exercises, and intelligence products, but these assessments will always struggle with uncertainty and U.S. defense analysts tend to translate uncertainty into risk. Likewise, being explicit about what analysis cannot or does not say is crucial. Since 2014, the UAF has gained important combat experience fighting Russian-led forces in the Eastern Ukraine regions of the Donbas, which has led to a large proportion of trained, experienced veterans among Ukraines population. Theres a problem with this observation though: Russian forces dont appear to have been operating in these groups during their worst engagements with Ukrainian forces. Unfortunately for the Russians, their system is designed to prevent precisely this. Report to Congress on Ukrainian Military Performance, Member Services call 800-233-8764 or 410-268-6110, U.K. Foreign Secretary Warns Against Easing Pressure on Russia. However, with mounting UAF losses and recruits with no experience as replacements, continuing the development of an effective NCO corps will likely remain a major challenge and a key UAF priority. . Additionally, the high level of experience and training among the recruits meant they were able to operate artillery, tank, and support systems that traditionally require time for reservists or volunteers to master. That debacle is now playing itself out on the battlefields of Ukraine, where its performance has been no better than in Chechnya and Georgia. Transparency International rates the risk of corruption in operations budgets at critical and high in the political oversight, financial, and procurement sectors. Another area the Russians claimed to have made improvements is in command and control (C2) capability, by refocusing on how they organize and the use modern secure communications systems. He noted that the Soviets would use existing units and send them into combat until they became combat ineffective. This failure indicates that the Russians have not invested enough in providing secure C2 assets to their forces. Since the beginning of the 2022 war, Ukraine reportedly has suffered high levels of casualties. Training recruits to conduct complex operations and operate advanced weapon systems takes longer, but both areas are widely considered necessary for the UAF to sustain combat operations in the current conflict. Several themes emerged from the discussion, including the difficulty of predicting combat performance, the corruption and gun-decking (falsification of reports) within the Russian armed forces, and the lunacy of the initial Russian war plan, which didnt reflect their military strategy, doctrine, exercises, or past operations, or even basic military principles like having a single commander. A major problem is corruption. Prior to that, Mr. Dougherty served as senior adviser to the deputy assistant secretary of defense for strategy and force development at the Department of Defense. The battle between Russian / Pro Russian forces and the defencing Ukrainian forces lead by Azov battalion continues in the port city of Mariupol. In a 2020 report, the Congressional Research Service identified the major areas for reform: modernizing military equipment, improving combat readiness and coordination across service branches, command and control, electronic warfare, recruitment of professional soldiers, force structure changes, and logistics. Alternatively, it can obscure exploitable weaknesses in enemy decision-making processes. Despite the likelihood that this perspective led them to overestimate Russian performance, this approach is preferable to the alternative. Read an overview of all that is included in our service. Russia's dismal military performance in Ukraine has shown not only that it has failed to achieve several of its stated priorities, but also that it has ignored the basic building blocks central to the efficient working of military forces. OBrien notes the failure of these units, which comprise infantry, armored vehicles, artillery, air defense, and supporting forces into a unit of about 800 troops. In the near term, this approach would likely underestimate Russias capacity to resist Ukrainian counter-offensives. One of the major areas that the Russians needed to change after 2008 was logistics. In the months since then, endless post-mortems have dissected the particular Russian blunders and Ukrainian successes that determined the course of the wars first weeks, and why military analysts were unable to foresee them. This hurts the Russian military where it matters on the front line. And yet, like Russian forces prior to their invasion of Ukraine, the performance of the Peoples Liberation Army remains a massive unknowable factor. Subscribe to World Politics Review and you'll receive instant access to 10,000+ articles in the World Politics Review Library, along with new Khi u khim tn t mt cng ty dc phm nh nm 1947, hin nay, Umeken nghin cu, pht trin v sn xut hn 150 thc phm b sung sc khe. Tam International phn phi cc sn phm cht lng cao trong lnh vc Chm sc Sc khe Lm p v chi tr em. Answering this question is key to guiding strategy in the present conflict particularly regarding war aims as well as U.S. defense strategy moving forward. The epoch of decay has been fully overcome, and the armed forces of the country are on the rise.. Virtually untested in a police action, Russias army looked sharp. Xin hn hnh knh cho qu v. When we design a wargame or build a computer model, we assume adversaries are competent. Going into the war, Westerners were guided by past gee-whiz articles, such as this April 2, 2014, piece in The New York Times: In Crimea, Russia Showcases a Rebooted Army. Written by two veteran reporters, the article came out two weeks after Russias virtually bloodless annexation of Ukraines Crimea peninsula, on the Black Sea. Too often, analysis focuses on a particular aspect of warfare, like air combat, and excludes the infrastructure and missions that support that aspect. It can overestimate competitors and lead to overallocation of resources. The situation cannot be considered normal when against us, there is a coalition of 42 countries and when our resources, military-political and military-technical, are limited.. Beyond Europe, analysts and policymakers may be lured into underestimating the capability of Chinas Peoples Liberation Army, particularly its ability to invade Taiwan. France failed in 1940 partly because it doggedly followed flawed planning and doctrine. One place where Russia has focused has been in munitions, particularly intermediate-range nuclear-capable systems such as the Iskander as well as precision-guided munitions (PGMs) such as the Kalibr. It is worth considering an alternative path of events. According to this tally, which draws on seven Ukrainian sources, Russia has lost: 208 fixed-wing aircraft in Ukraine, almost double the losses in Afghanistan; 866 artillery pieces, double the losses in Afghanistan; 3,343 armored personnel carriers, 2.5 times the losses in Afghanistan; and 1,361 tanks, nine times the losses in Afghanistan. This helps explain why estimates of Russian performance in Ukraine have been wrong they assumed Russian operations would follow their doctrine, and yet they mostly havent. I recently appeared on an episode of the War on the Rocks podcast along with two Russia experts Michael Kofman and Dara Massicot and military historian Gian Gentile to discuss how analysts misjudged Russias armed forces and their invasion of Ukraine. An understanding of the evolving state of the UAF may be of interest to Congress as it continues to weigh policies potentially supporting Ukraines defense against Russian aggression. What went wrong for the Russians? Citing the massive Western aid in the pipeline for Ukraine this summer, he said: The Ukrainian army can arm a million people., Referring to Ukrainian soldiers, he noted: The desire to defend their motherland very much exists. A competent NCO corps is what makes the most effective militaries in the world function at the tactical level. It informs its troops about the upcoming operation and trains them realistically.

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